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 1  Introduction 
Whenever high technology products of different firms interact with each other technological 
standards are required. These standards are based on patents that are often owned by different 
patent holders. Each patent holder, when setting the royalty for his patents, does not take into 
account that an increase of his royalty rate reduces demand for the final products and thereby 
reduces the profits of the other essential patent holders. This externality is the so called 
“complements problem” that gives rise to excessively high royalties.  
A straightforward solution to the complements problem is a patent pool that jointly 
markets all essential patents. Even though a patent pool is a cartel that fixes an essential input 
price for downstream products, competition authorities acknowledge that patent pools of 
complementary patents can be procompetitive if they reduce royalty rates and transaction 
costs by allowing for “one-stop shoping”. In Section 2 I review and discuss the complements 
problem and the role played by patent pools in more detail. 
While the impact of patent pools on royalty setting is fairly well understood, much 
less is known about their dynamic effects. The prospect of a patent pool increases future 
profits and thereby presumably increases the incentives of the involved parties to invest into 
the technologies they contribute to the standard. However, there are two problems. First, if 
firms compete to get their technology included in the standard and to be a member of the 
patent pool there is a “business stealing effect” that may induce firms to invest too much. 
Second, a patent pool solves the complements problem but not the team production problem 
that arises when the investment of one firm benefits all other firms that belong to the pool. 
This induces firms to invest too little. In Section 3 I discuss how to induce firms to invest 
efficiently. There I show that patent pools requiring grantbacks that are formed at an early 
stage of the standardization process can play an important role to improve innovation 
incentives.  
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 Even though patent pools can have many desirable properties firms often fail to form a 
pool that includes all essential patents. In many cases no pool is formed at all. Instead 
standard setting organizations require their members to set “reasonable and non-
discriminatory” (RAND) royalties.1 RAND commitments prevent outright refusal to license 
and exclusive licensing, but they impose hardly any additional constraints on royalties. As 
Swanson and Baumol (2005) put it: “It is widely acknowledged that, in fact, there are no 
generally agreed tests to determine whether a particular license does or does not satisfy a 
RAND commitment.” Thus, they do not solve the complements problem. But even if a patent 
pool is formed, it is often the case that some holders of essential patents choose not to join it 
because they are better off free riding on the low royalties chosen by the firms that are in the 
pool. In these cases the pool mitigates the complements problem, but it does not fully solve it. 
In Section 4 I discuss the incentives of firms to form a patent pool. The more firms there are 
the larger is the problem of pool stability. I propose a new procedure for the approval of 
patent pools that I call “full functionality approval”. This procedute makes every patent 
holder pivotal for the viability of the pool. If it was was adopted by competition authorities it 
would be much easier to form welfare increasing patent pools. 
In Section 5 I briefly discuss some policy implications of the theoretical analysis. I 
argue that competition authorities should not just tolerate but actively encourage and support 
patent pools that satisfy certain conditions. In particular they should allow for early patent 
pools that require grantbacks even if fairly high royalties are set. This encourages innovation 
and does not reduce social welfare if royalty rates can be renegotiated. I also argue that 
competition authorities should adopt a system of “full functionality approval” in order to 
solve the free rider problem in pool formation.    
                                                 
1
 In Europe many SSOs require royalties to be “fair” in addition. 
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 2 The Complements Problem 
Cournot (1838, Chapter 9) was the first to discover that if a good requires complementary 
inputs that are supplied by different firms each of which has market power then the suppliers 
exert an externality on each other that may result in excessively high prices, prices that are 
even higher than the monopoly price. To illustrate his point Cournot used the example of the 
market for brass. Brass is produced from copper and zinc in fixed proportions (about 2:1, 
depending on the type of brass). Suppose that these two inputs are controlled by two different 
monopolists. When setting his price the copper monopolist does not take into account that by 
increasing his price he reduces the profits of the zinc monopolist, because an increase in his 
price reduces the demand for brass and thereby also the demand for zinc. Similarly, an 
increase of the zinc price reduces the demand for copper which is not taken into account by 
the zinc monopolist.  In equilibrium the two monopolists charge prices that are higher than 
the prices that an integrated monopolist (supplying both copper and zinc) would choose. This 
implies that if the two monopolists could form a cartel they would agree to cartel prices that 
are lower than current market prices and that would benefit both, the two monopolists and 
consumers. In fact, this problem is very similar to the double marginalization problem that 
arises in a chain of monopolies, where vertical integration can raise industry profits and social 
welfare.   
 
2.1 Standard Setting and Patent Thickets 
At first glance Cournot’s example may seem extreme and and not very realistic, but due to 
recent technological developments an even more extreme situation arises frequently with high 
technology products that interact with each other or with complementary products. Interaction 
requires that all products comply with the same technological standard. For example, a 
cellphone can communicate with another cellphone only if both of them use the same 
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 communication standard (such as UMTS) , a DVD can be read by different DVD players only 
if all comply with the same DVD standard, and so on.  These technological standards use 
dozens or even hundreds of patents owned by many different IP holders.  
Ex ante, before the standard is set, there may be several different technological 
solutions to a given problem and therefore several different patents competing with each 
other. Ex post, however, after one solution has been selected and the standard has been set, 
the patents required for this standard become “essential”:  Because large investments in the 
development of products based on this standard have been sunk it is impossible or 
prohibitively expensive to circumvent the patents used by the standard. Each holder of an 
essential patent is now a monopolist controlling the supply of a complementary input. The 
more different patent holders there are, the more severe the complements problem is. Shapiro 
(2001) who rediscovered the relevance of Cournot’s original analysis for high technology 
markets calls this situation a “patent thicket”. 
 
2.2. Cross Licensing Agreements and Patent Pools 
Natural solutions to the complements problem are cross licensing agreements and patent 
pools. With a cross licensing agreement two firms owning complementary patents license 
their patents to each other at low royalties or royalty free. Cross licensing agreements can 
solve the complements problem between two symmetric firms that both own complementary 
patents and that both use these patents for the production of some downstream good. 
However, they have two disadvantages. First, they cannot be used if one of the firms is a 
technology specialist who owns an essential patent but does not produce on the downstream 
market because such a firm has no use for the patent of the other patent holder. Second, when 
the number  of essential patent holders grows the number of required cross-licensing N
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 ¦ ) . Thus, when many potentially asymmetric firms are 
involved a patent pool outperforms cross licensing agreements. Ideally, the patent pool 
contains all patents that are required for the standard and licenses them as a bundle. The 
royalty income of the pool is then distributed according to a predertimend sharing rule among 
the patent holders. The patent pool internalizes the complements problem and reduces 
transaction costs by allowing for “one stop shopping”.  
 To be sure, a patent pool is an agreement to fix input prices, i.e. a cartel. A patent pool 
always has an incentive to charge a price for the bundle of patents that maximizes industry 
profits and implements the monopoly price on the downstream market. If the patents are 
substitutes, this may turn a competitive market into a monopoly and lower social welfare. 
However, if the patents are complements the monopoly price is lower than the sum of the 
royalties that the firms would charge individually. Thus, the patent pool reduces the price for 
the bundle of patents and raises social welfare. Furthermore, the monopoly price is socially 
desirable. After all, patent holders have been granted a monopoly on their patents by the 
government as a reward for their innovation efforts. 
 
2.3 Vertically integrated and Non-integrated Patent Holders 
Some patent holders are technology specialists who are active only on the upstream market 
for technology, while others are vertically integrated and also manufacture products that are 
sold downstream to final consumers. It is sometimes argued that in the absence of a pool 
vertically integreated firms will charge lower royalties because they are more concerned 
about the downstream market. Kim (2004) and Schmidt (2008) show that this need not be the 
case. To the contrary, vertically integrated firms have an incentive to increase royalties in 
order to raise their rival’s costs.  
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  However, with a patent pool there is a conflict of interest between vertically integrated 
and non-integrated firms when it comes to the determination of royalties charged by the pool. 
Vertically integrated firms make part of their profits downstream. They have an incentive to 
lower royalties in order to shift profits downstream at the expense of non-integrated patent 
holders who make all their profits upstream. Thus, it may be difficult to agree to a patent pool 
if patent holders are asymmetric.  
 
2.4 Distinguishing Patents that are Complements from Patents that are 
Substitutes 
The papers considered so far assume that all patents are perfect complements. Indeed, 
the recent doctrine of competition authorities is that only essential patents be included in a 
patent pool.2 When all patents are perfect complements a patent pool unambiguously 
increases social welfare, and it unambiguously decreases social welfare when all patents are 
perfect substitutes. However, it is often unclear whether patents complement each other or 
compete with each other. Lerner and Tirole (2004) have shown that whether patents are 
complements or substitutes is endogenous and depends in general on the licensing fees 
charged for them. Thus, it may be difficult for competition authorities to determine whether a 
patent should be allowed in a pool or not.  
 However, Lerner and Tirole also point out a simple screening mechanism to 
distinguish welfare-increasing patent pools from pools that lower welfare. They show that 
welfare-decreasing pools are unstable if independent licensing by pool members outside the 
pool is possible, while welfare-increasing pools are unaffected. If patents are substitutes 
patent owners can compete outside the pool and thereby undermine the cartel. If patents are 
complements this option is unattractive and not harmful to the pool. It may even be beneficial 
if the patents can be used for other applications. Thus, requiring patent pools to grant 
                                                 
2
 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have softened this stance in their joint report on antitrust and 
IP issued April 2007 (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/ireport.shtm ). Now they acknolwedge that including substitute patents 
need not be anti-competitive. Patent pools will be reviewed according to the rule of reason in the future. See also Layne-
Farrar and Lerner (2008, p. 8). 
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 permission to independent licensing is a simple safeguard against welfare-decreasing pools. 
In fact, in an empirical study of 63 patent pools formed in the US between 1895 and 2001 
Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole (2007) find that patent pools are indeed more likely to have 
independent licensing when patents are complements.  
 
3. Patent Pools and the Innovation Incentives  
While the complements problem and the beneficial effects of patent pools on pricing are well 
understood by now, the literature has largely ignored the question of which effect a patent 
pool has on the incentives of the involved firms to develop new and improve existing 
technologies. Two types of innovations have to be distinguished. Ex ante innovations are 
innovations that are made before a standard is formed. Firms compete to get their 
technologies into the standard. Ex post innovations are innovations that can be made after the 
basic technologies for the standard have been selected. A firm contributing to the standard 
can then invest to further improve its technology.  
 A patent pool increases the profits made by the firms that own IP rights that are 
essential to the standard. Thus, the anticipation of a patent pool always increases the 
incentives to invest. However, in the case of ex ante innovations firms may invest too much, 
while they always invest too little in case of ex post innovations.  
  
3.1 Ex ante Innovations 
Dequiedt and Versaevel (2006) consider a dynamic model with symmetric firms each of 
which invests continuously over time. Innovations are modeled by a Poisson process. A 
patent pool is formed if  independent innovations have been made. The value of an 
innovation is larger when it is included in the pool. Thus, there is a patent race where each 
firm tries to be among the first  innovators. The prospect of the pool increases investment 
N
K N
K
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 incentives. Moreover, the investment pattern is upward sloping over time until the pool is 
formed. Note, however, that the private value of being in the pool is larger than the social 
value. Thus, there is a “business stealing effect” and firms may have an incentive to invest too 
much.  
Gilbert and Katz (2009) ask how the overinvestment problem can be solved. They also 
consider a patent race model. There are innovations required for a new standard to work, 
but only two firms competing to make these innovations. The innovations are perfect 
complements. If each firm makes at least one innovation then both firms are required for the 
standard. If one firm makes all K innovations then this firm is a monopolist and sets up the 
standard alone. Thus, on the one hand, each firm has an incentive to underinvest because 
there is a free-rider problem. A discovery made by firm 1 also benefits firm 2 if both of them 
are required for the standard. On the other hand, a firm has an incentive to make all 
discoveries itself in order to prevent the other firm from participating in the standard. If the 
latter “business stealing” effect is sufficiently strong, firms invest too much. Gilbert and Katz 
(2009) characterize the optimal sharing rule that induces both firms to invest efficiently. The 
optimal rule is linear in the number of patents owned by each firm. In order to induce firms to 
invest efficiently the optimal sharing rule has to be complemented by a tax (or subsidy) 
imposed by the government that reduces the profits of the patent pool and thereby investment 
incentives. Unfortunately, the optimal tax depends on the parameters of the model and is 
therefore difficult to implement in practice. 
K
 
3.2 Ex post Innovations 
Another interesting and important case is the ex post situation where the standard has been 
formed and the major technologies have been chosen already, but before the standard is 
commercially implemented additional innovations that improve the standard can be made.  
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 Layne-Farrar (2009, p.4) considers ex post innovation and patenting in the 3G mobile 
telecom standard. She reports that “at the time the technology for the UMTS mobile telecoms 
standard was selected, the document specifying a crucial component was only 30 pages long, 
but by the time the standard was ready for commercial implementation the page count had 
increased to over 13,000.” This suggests that ex post innovation is indeed important.3  
 The analysis of this case is straightforward. Consider a situation where firms each 
contributed a basic technology to the standard. Suppose that 
N
M of these firms, M Nd , can 
now make an investment that improves the quality of their technology. Higher quality may 
result in lower production costs for downstream producers or in higher valuations of 
consumers. Without a pooling agreement firms impose two externalities on each other. First, 
because of the complements problem royalties will be set too high. This reduces demand for 
the final product and thereby reduces the incentive to invest for each firm. Second, investing 
in quality increases the demand for the final good and thereby the demand for the 
complementary patents. This gives rise to a team production problem. Each firm benefits 
from the investment of the other firm: When choosing its investment level a firm does not 
take into account the positive external effect of its investment on the profits of other patent 
holders. Thus, again, this induces firms to invest too little.  
 Suppose now that firms know at the time of their investment decisions that a patent 
pool will be formed licensing all essential patents as a bundle.  Because the royalties charged 
by the pool are lower than the sum of the royalties firms would charge individually, the total 
quantity sold downstream and total profits increase which increases each firm’s investment 
incentives. The patent pool solves the complements problem given the investments that have 
been undertaken, but it does not solve the team production problem. It is still the case that 
                                                 
3
 It is sometimes argued that ex post patenting is opportunistic and aimed at shifting rents and getting a larger share of the 
standard’s royalty revenues. However, Layne-Farrar (2009) rejects the hypothesis that all ex post patenting is opportunistic 
and only directed at shifting rents. Instead, on the basis of reasonable empirical measures she finds that many ex post patents 
are valuable and reflect genuine innovations. 
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 each firm has to share the fruits of its investment with all other essential patent holders. Thus, 
investments are lower than if all firms were fully integrated.  
 Is it possible to solve the team production problem and to induce efficient ex post 
innovations, i.e. innovations that a fully integrated firm would have chosen? The problem is 
that the royalty rate is endogenously determined by the investments. If the royalty could be 
set exogenously it would be easy to induce efficient investments. The marginal benefit of the 
investment is the marginal increase of downstream production due to the higher quality of the 
standard times , the royalty rate collected by firm i. If  is set such that the marginal benefit 
of investment equals marginal cost of investment at the efficient investment level, the firm 
will invest efficiently.  
ir ir
This can be implemented by giving the patent pool the option to buy out the patent 
holders who invested. Suppose that M N , i.e.  there are some pool members who do not 
invest. When the standard is set all essential patent holders form a patent pool that contains 
the relevant patents on which the standard is based. Furthermore, all contributing parties 
commit to include all future patents that are required by the standard to the patent pool, i.e., 
so called “grantbacks” are imposed.4 The patent pool fixes optimal linear royalties  that 
induce each investing party i  to invest efficiently. The problem is that ex post these royalties 
are likely to be inefficient, so firms have an incentive to renegotiate them. Suppose the patent 
pool has the option to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to buy out those members that had to 
invest. They are offered a fixed fee equal to the royalty income they would have received in 
the absence of renegotion. This leaves their investment incentives unaffected. Then the pool 
chooses the optimal royalty rate that maximizes industry profits.  
ir
It is important that the renegotiation offer is made by a party that does not invest to 
induce the other parties to invest efficiently. But even if all parties have to invest the 
                                                 
4
 Grantbacks are a regular feature of many patent pools with complementary patents. See Lerner et al. (2007).  
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 mechanism of forming an early patent pool with high royalties that are renegotiated 
downwards after investments have been sunk can increase investments and welfare as 
compared to a situation where no early pool can be formed. 
 
4. Voluntary Participation in a Patent Pool 
Patent pools for complementary patents have very desirable properties, but in many cases 
they are not formed or do not include all essential patents. The problem is that firms have to 
join a patent pool voluntarily, and they often choose not to do so. Sometimes firms participate 
in the standard setting process to make sure that their technology is included in the standard, 
but then refuse to join the patent pool. For example, shortly before the establishment of the 
MPEG-2 pool, Lucent chose not to participate because it concluded to be better off licensing 
outside the pool than being a pool member.5 Sometimes a patent pool break up and several 
mutually exclusive patent pools are formed. For example, there were ten firms involved in the 
standard setting efforts for digital versatile discs (DVDs). However, after the standard was set 
these firms split up into two mutually exclusive patent pools. Even though industry experts 
agree that this is inefficient, firms have been unable to agree to one large pool.6 A 
munfacturing firm has to license both patent pools in order to be compliant with the standard. 
 
 
4.1  Free-Riding on the Pool 
The reason for the failure to form an all inclusive patent pool is again a free rider problem. It 
would be profit maximizing for the group of all essential patent holders to form a patent pool 
and charge the full integration royalty rate for the bundle of all essential patents, but for any 
                                                 
5
 See Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008, p. 7). 
6
 See Merges (1999, p. 36-37) for a discussion of why two separate pools formed.  
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 individual patent holder it is even better not to join but to free-ride on the low royalty set for 
the other patents in the pool by charging a higher royalty rate himself.  
Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) consider a firm’s incentives to join a patent pool. They 
show that if there are three or more symmetric patent holders that do not produce on the 
downstream market, then not joining the pool is always profitable as a unilateral conduct (i.e., 
as long as the other parties still form a pool). Furthermore, if there are different types of firms, 
some vertically integrated (i.e. owning essential patents but also manufacturing output) and 
some “R&D only” firms (i.e. owning essential patents but not producing downstream), then 
there is a conflict of interest. As discussed in Section 2.3 already, vertically integrated firms 
want royalties to be low in order to shift profits to the downstream market, while “R&D only” 
firms want royalties to be higher because they make all their profits upstream. Thus, vertically 
integrated firms have stronger incentives to join a patent pool than non integrated firms.   
 
4.2 Patent-Pool Participation under Different Sharing Rules 
Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) present empirical evidence on the factors affecting the 
decision to join a patent pool. They find that vertically integrated firms are indeed more likely 
to join a pool. They also look at how different sharing rules affect the incentives to join. They 
show that pools adopting numeric proportional sharing rules (royalties are shared in 
proportion to the number of patents submitted to the pool) tend to attract fewer joiners 
because simple patent counting does not reflect the value of the patents. Furthermore, firms 
with more valuable patent portfolios (as measured by citations) alre less likely to join a pool 
that uses a numeric proportional sharing rule.  
Layne-Farrar, Llobet and Padilla (2010) theoretically evaluate another sharing rule 
that has been proposed as a means of avoiding patent hold up. The “incremental value rule” 
rewards each firm equal to the value that their patented technology contributes to the standard 
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 on an ex ante basis (compared to the next best alternative). This rule has many attractive 
properties, but the authors show that it fails to induce firms to join a patent pool whenever this 
is efficient. The larger the number of essential patent holders, the lower is the probability that 
a pool will be formed.  
 
 
4.3 Patent Pool Stability  
Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) consider the incentives of an individual patent holder to join a pool, 
assuming that the pool will be formed in any case. However, this is not necessarily the case. If 
firm 1 does not participate in the pool it may be optimal for the remaining firms not to 
join a pool either. This stabilizes the “grand pool” (that includes all esential patents): If firm 1 
anticipates that its refusal to join the pool will induce all firms to break off as well and to set 
their royalties non-cooperatively, then firm 1 is better off joining the pool. Aoki and Nagaoka 
(2005) analyze this problem as a coalition formation problem using the tools of cooperative 
game theory. They show that if the number of essential patent holders grows it becomes more 
and more difficult to sustain pool stability.  
1N 
To illustrate this point consider a simple example: There is a perfectly competitive 
downstream market with a linear demand funct b pion Q A 
i
p c
 
 
 , where Q  is the total 
quantity sold, A,b >0 are parameters, and p is the market price. In competitive equilibrium the 
market price is equal to the perceived marginal cost of the downstream firm irs, so 
1
N¦ , 
here c is the marginal cost of downstream production and ir  is the royalty charged by patent w
holder i , ^ `1i tio  ,..., N . Consider the following three situa ns.
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 x Non Integration: If all N  firms choose their royalties non-cooperatively there is a 
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each firm sets ( 1)
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x Partial Integration: If 1N  firms form a patent pool while firm 1 sets its royalty rate 
non-cooperatively, then there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which firm 1 
chooses 1 3
PI A bc
r
b
  and the pool chooses for each of its members 
3 ( 1)
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Note first that , i.e. all firms are better off with the grand patent pool than with non 
integration. Note also that  , i.e. firm 1 is better off not joining the pool if all other 
firms form a pool of size . This is the free-rider problem. Thus, the crucial question is 
whether it is profitable for the remaining 
FI NI
i3 ! 3 i
11
PI FI3 ! 3
1N 
1N  firms to form a pool of their own. If 5N   it 
is easy to check that PI NIi i3  3 , so they will not form a pool. This stabilizes the grand pool. 
Each firm anticipates that if it does not join the grand pool then no pool will be formed, so 
each firm has an incentive to join. In 5N  the remaining 4 firms are just indifferent whether 
to form a pool on their own or not. If we have 5N ! PI NIi i3 ! 3 , so the remaining firms 
will always form a pool which induces firm 1 not to join the grand pool.
1N 
7
 
                                                 
7
 Unfortunately, the analysis of Aoki and Nagaoka (2005) is incomplete. They do not consider the possibility that if N grows 
larger, it becomes more attractive for (N-1) firms to form a pool on their own, but this pool may also become unstable: firm 2 
may choose not join any pool if it expects the remaining (N-2) firms to form a pool. This in turn could induce firm 1 not to 
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4.3 With a Little Help from the Competition Authority 
The free rider problem could be solved if each firm was pivotal: If it does not join the grand 
pool then no pool will be formed and all patent holders will choose their royalties non-
cooperatively. However, the previous example shows that this threat is not credible for large 
, because even if some essential patent holders do not join the grand pool it is still optimal 
for the others to form a smaller pool without them.  
N
This problem can be solved if the competition authorities adopt the following 
procedure for getting a patent pool approved. I will call this procedure “Full Functionality 
Approval”:  
x The full functionality of the standard has to be described, i.e. what can be achieved by 
the standard without access to any additional patents. 
x The maximum total royalty for the bundle of all patents has to be specified.  
x Each patent holder keeps the right to license his patents independently outside the 
pool. 
x Grantbacks are imposed, i.e. each patent holder commits to include all future patents 
in the pool that are essential to the standard.   
The patent authority approves the patent pool under the condition that no additional patents 
are required to achieve the described functionality. Thus, it is the responsibility of the patent 
pool to include all relevant patents. If a licensee proves to the competition authorities that full 
functionality cannot be achieved legally with the patents included in the pool or that he has to 
pay higher royalties in order to achieve legal full functionality, then this licensee can use the 
patents of the pool for free. If the competition authority learns (this way or another) that 
                                                                                                                                                        
leave the grand pool in the first place. In the linear example given above this does not cause a problem. With N>5 the grand 
pool will never form. However, this problem has not been ruled out in general.   
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 additional patents are required to achieve full functionality, then the approval of the patent 
pool is null and void and each member has to charge his royalties non-cooperatively. 
Suppose that the competition authority adopts “Full Functionality Approval”.  
Consider a standard that requires N essential patents to be fully functional. If a patent pool 
adopts a sharing rule that gives each essential patent holder at least as much as he would have 
received if all patent holders set their royalties independently, then all patent holders will join 
the patent pool. Because the patent pool is efficient such a sharing rule always exists. 
Full Functionality Approval makes every essential patent holder pivotal. If he does not 
join the pool, full functionality cannot legally be achieved without infringing on his patent, so 
a pool will not be approved, or approval will be withdrawn as soon as he complains that the 
standard infringes on his patent rights.  Thus, any patent holder not joining the pool causes all 
other patent holders to set their royalty rates non-cooperatively. The patent pool gives each 
patent holder at least as much as he would have gotten if royalties were set non-cooperatively, 
so it is optimal for each patent holder to join. Because the pool is more efficient than non-
cooperative royalty setting it is always possible to share the royalties of the pool such that 
each patent holder is better off.  
 Note that licensees play an important role for this mechanism to work. If there is an 
essential patent holder outside the pool charging additional royalties, the pool has an incentive 
not to raise this issue with the competition authorities if it is afraid that the pool will be 
dissolved. However, a licensee has a strong incentive to report this to the competition 
authorities because he is rewarded with a free license for all patents in the pool. The free 
license does not expropriate pool members because they voluntarily agreed to join the pool 
under the conditions of Full Functionality Approval.   
This mechanism has the additional advantage of deterring so called “patent trolls”, i.e. 
firms secretly holding patents that are essential for the standard. A patent troll waits until the 
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 standard has been set and large investments have been sunk. Then he steps out, sues the other 
patent holders for infringing on his patent and uses an injunction to hold them up.8 With Full 
Functionality Approval this strategy is self-defeating. If a patent troll sues the other patent 
holders the pool is automatically dissolved. Thus, negotiations about a new pool have to start 
from scratch. All patent holders are again symmetric and there is no benefit to the patent troll 
from hiding his patent. The members of the old patent pool will offer to add his patent to the 
other N patents in a new pool and to give the patent troll a share of 1/(N+1) of the pool 
royalties. Because in this situation all patent holders are symmetric the patent troll cannot 
expect to extract a higher share of the pool revenues. This is what he would have gotten in the 
first place had he participated in the forming of the old pool. Thus, being a patent troll does 
not pay off. 
 
5  Policy Implications 
Because a patent pool is an agreement to fix input prices, it can and has been used to form a 
cartel and to suppress competition on markets that would otherwise be competitive. This is 
the reason why patent pools have been considered illegal per se by the US antitrust authorities 
until the mid 1990s.9 Competition authorities have come to treat patent pools for 
complementary patents more favorably in recent years. For example, in the Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights (1995, p. 28), jointly issued by 
the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, it is acknowledged that 
patent pools “provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, 
reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement 
lititation”10. However, the agencies also point out that “pooling arrangements can have 
                                                 
8
 See Lemley and Shapiro (2007) and Layne-Farrar and Schmidt (2010) for a more detailed discussion of “patent trolls”. 
9
 See Gilbert (2004) for a historical review of the role of patent pools in the U.S. economy.  
10
 US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1995), “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property”, April 6, 1995, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf .  
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 anticompetitive effects”, and that when “pooling arrangements are mechanisms to accomplish 
naked price fixing or market devision, they are subject to challenge under the per se rule.” 
This is an important reason why standard setting organizations often carefully avoid talking 
about royalties and why patent pools, if they are formed at all, are often formed rather late in 
the standardization process.  
 The preceeding sections have shown that patent pools can play an important role in 
lowering royalties, reducing transaction costs, disseminating new technologies, and fostering 
innovation incentives. However, due to the free rider problem in pool formation, the larger 
the number of essential patent holders the more difficult it is to establish a pool that comprises 
all essential patents. Thus, we are probably seeing less and smaller patent pools than would be 
socially optimal. 
 Competition authorities should not only tolerate patent pools but actively encourage 
them, provided that pools allow for independent licensing outside the pool and require 
grantbacks. These safeguard are necessary to make sure that the pool is not used to suppress 
competition between patents that are substitutes and that follow-up innovations cannot be 
used to block the pool. With these safeguards in place there is little risk that patent pools are 
anti-competitive.  
 Patent pools are not just a means to solve the complements problem, they can also be 
used to mitigate the free rider problem in innovation incentives. However, this requires that 
pools are formed at an early stage of the standardization process. The combination of high 
royalties and grantback provisions can give powerful investment incentives, in particular 
when these royalties are renegotiated after investments are made. Thus, competition should be 
more lenient towards early pools, even if they set royalties that seem higher than socially 
optimal.  
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  A second suggestion is to adopt a system of “full functionality approval”. Because 
each patent holder wants to free-ride on the low royalties set by the other patent holders who 
stay in the pool, many pools do not form or do not include all essential patents. “Full 
functionality approval” can help to solve this problem by making every patent holder pivotal. 
Each patent holder knows that without his cooperation a pool cannot be sustained and 
everybody will charge royalties non-cooperativly. This increases the incentives to disclose all 
relevant patents and to join the pool.   
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